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Modern communications technologies have given rise to new forms of mass media blurring traditional boundaries of journalistic activity. Online versions of traditional print newspapers and broadcast radio and TV news and other programmes exist with possibility for input, commentary or other feedback from the public via, e.g., their on-the-spot photos from mobile phones, responsive postings, issue voting, etc. Traditional media​[1]​ are increasingly using new communication formats, often called ‘social media’ - such as blogs, Twitter,​[2]​ Facebook​[3]​and YouTube​[4]​ - to distribute information and express opinions about an unlimited range of matters public and private.​[5]​  
There are also hybrid forms of online publication that challenge neat categorization.  Wikileaks is merely one example. ​[6]​ ‘Wikileaks’ garnered considerable media attention recently with its startling exposés of leaked diplomatic cables and other confidential documents provided by various sources. Generating considerably less attention was Wikileak’s efforts to structure its operations to try to legally protect its confidential sources and others.​[7]​ Among other things, it used the hosting services of a Swedish ISP in order to be considered a Swedish Internet publication and subject to Swedish constitutional law that provides nearly absolute protection to confidential sources of media publications, including licensed Internet publications found eligible to qualify for these protections under implementing regulations, addressed further below. However, even the limited review and eligibility criteria for such certification under Sweden’s constitutional law and ensuing regulation seemingly conflicts with the European Court of Justice’s recent definition of what comprises ‘journalism’ on the Internet in the context of another legal privilege for the press: the ‘journalistic purposes’ exception to EU Data Protection Directive​[8]​ obligations.   
In Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy,​[9]​ (‘Satakunnan’) the ECJ established a test for journalism that, as will be seen, it is so broadly formulated and encompassing that it is hard to envision what or who it excludes, rendering practical application difficult. The test derived by the ECJ, purportedly to set a balance within the Directive​[10]​ for article 10, European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘Convention’) considerations, does not appear to have been required by the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence thereunder. This interface with European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence under the European Convention of Human Rights (Convention)​[11]​ is considered briefly below.  This is interesting as the Court of Justice has declared itself bound to follow this jurisprudence as a general principle of EU law based on the constitutional traditions of the Member States. One of these is, of course, Sweden’s which includes the oldest freedom of the press and speech laws in Europe if not the world.​[12]​  Possible conflicts between the ECJ’s test and other Member State provisions defining ‘journalist’ generally under media law traditionally outside of EU competence, e.g., such as Italy’s journalist licensing scheme, also cannot be ruled out. 
This article examines the above issues. It first explores ECJ’s decision in Satakunnan. In doing so, it considers how this analysis comports with the application of media privilege under the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. It then examines the potential conflict with this construction of an EU Directive with media laws in Member States, areas of law traditionally outside of EU competence. Finally, it considers the potential consequences of the Satakunnan decision.
2.	The ECJ decision in Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy​[13]​
In December 2008, the ECJ answered a question of first impression for it that was preliminarily referred by the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court regarding interpretation of the ‘journalistic purposes’ derogation contained in Article 9, EU Data Protection Directive to resolve a disagreement between the Finnish Data Protection Board and the Finnish Data Protection Ombudsman.
Here, two media entities, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy (‘Satakunnan’) and Satamedia Oy (‘Satamedia’) reused income tax information of Finnish citizens contained in a public register and which comprised information in the public domain to which any person may request access under the Finnish law on the public disclosure and confidentiality of tax information.​[14]​ Specifically, the register contained an alphabetical listing by name of 1.2 million persons earning above certain amounts, their income and wealth tax sorted by municipality and income bracket.​[15]​
Satakaunnan annually published the information by region in regional editions of a newspaper. Satakaunnan then transferred this data onto CD-ROMs which it gave to Satamedia, an affiliate company. Via agreement with a mobile phone company, the companies set up a service for Satamedia whereby mobile telephone users could receive text-messages (‘SMS’) with requested extracts of the published information for approximately €2 per request.​[16]​ Both the newspaper and the SMS service, however, allowed personal data to be removed on request.​[17]​ 
The Data Protection Board and the Administrative Court of Helsinki both rejected the Data Protection Ombudsman’s application filed in response to complaints of violations of privacy rights and which sought to enjoin this processing of personal data.​[18]​ On the Ombudsman’s further appeal, the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court certified four questions for the ECJ’s preliminary ruling, only one of which is relevant here: whether the above-described activities of Satamedia and Satakaunnan relating to data from documents which are in the public domain under national legislation must be regarded as the processing of personal data carried out solely for ‘journalistic purposes’ within the meaning of Article 9, Directive.​[19]​ Article 9 permits Member States to limit application of the Directive’s obligations on controllers of personal data where the processing is solely for journalistic purposes and only where necessary to reconcile individual freedoms with the right to receive and impart information under Article 10, ECHR.​[20]​  
The Court of Justice, ultimately, did not answer the question. Rather, it set a test of what comprises ‘journalistic purposes’ and remanded the case to the Finnish Court to determine on the facts of the case if the test was met. The exercise, the Court of Justice noted, was a reconciliation of two fundamental rights: the right of privacy, the primary purpose of the Directive,​[21]​ and freedom of expression for which derogations from the Directive must only apply as strictly necessary.​[22]​ Despite noting the narrow construction applicable to derogations, the Court of Justice asserted that the importance of freedom of expression in all democratic societies required broad interpretation of its related ideas, including journalism.​[23]​ Therefore, Article 9’s exemptions and derogations apply not only to media organisations but to every person engaged in journalism.​[24]​ Considering the evolution and growth of communication methods and means for dissemination of information, the Court of Justice held that the “medium … used to transmit the processed data, whether … classic in nature, such as paper or radio waves, or electronic, such as the internet, is not determinative as to whether an activity is undertaken ‘solely for journalistic purposes.’” ​[25]​ Similarly not preclusive is whether the publication is undertaken for profit-making reasons since commercial success may be essential to professional journalistic activity.​[26]​ Rather, the Court of Justice ruled that the activities in question are to be considered as being “solely for journalistic purposes” within Article 9, Directive 95/46/EC “if the sole object of those activities is the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas.” ​[27]​ 
This is a sweeping formulation of journalism. “Information” is a broad concept inclusive of data or facts of any kind. The Court of Justice did not qualify this in any way other than that it be disseminated to the public. “Opinion” and “ideas” although more contextual are also extremely broad categories which may overlap with each other and comprise information depending on how the former is defined. Thus, where the boundaries lie between journalism as defined by the Court of Justice here and any other communications are not immediately discernable. 
Turning to the remainder of the Court of Justice’s test, it is also not fully clear what comprises “disclosure to the public”. For example, on remand, the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court determined that this processing did not fall within journalistic purposes since Satamedia’s SMS distribution of the tax and income related personal data, inter alia, did not comprise disclosure to the public because specific information was sent only upon individual request.​[28]​ Yet, there are information services, notably many online newspapers falling within traditional concepts of journalism, for which persons must individually request information such as emails containing daily headlines and columns or register to join their columnists’ Twitter lists for updates on a story or blog, etc. Indeed, some online newspapers such are only available to registered readers.  Is the request for a particular piece of information upon individual request in Satakaunnan distinguishable from a database service where, for example, a subscriber can request a particular kind of information such as Westlaw, a legal online database publisher that collects and discloses to any subscribing member of the public information, opinions and ideas that have been first published elsewhere? 
Also, where do the boundaries now lie between activities for journalistic purposes and other communications, including social media? A publicly microblogged update of one’s own and others’ routine daily activities on open Twitter would be information solely for the purpose of disclosure to any or all members of the public who cared and, therefore, seemingly within the context of the definition. Yet, under the Court of Justice’s Lindqvist​[29]​ decision, virtually the same conduct by a Swedish church lady involving the posting of photos and activities of her fellow churchgoers on a website was conduct sufficient to subject her to criminal liability under Swedish law, although a defense of journalistic purpose was not there in issue.​[30]​ A Swedish Supreme Court case involving another Swedish website, Prosecutor v Ramsbro,​[31]​ seemingly offered a rational basis for distinguishing the site in question from Linqvist. This had spotlighted activities of various banks and bankers contributing to a financial crisis. The Supreme Court held that this was within the journalistic exception of the Swedish Data Protection Act as information, inter alia, contributing to a public debate and because the information focused on the public life of the bankers in their professional capacity.  However, the Satakuannan decision has not delimited the dissemination of information to that involving a public interest.​[32]​
Similarly, how, under the imprecise boundaries of this test, does unsolicited commercial information, or spam, distributed to the public electronically for direct marketing purposes and unlawful without explicit prior consent under the Electronic Communications Privacy Directive,​[33]​ differ from the disclosure of information, idea or opinion to the public by electronic means which comprises journalism and exempt from the consent requirements of the Data Protection Directive under Article 9? ​[34]​ Since any medium of modern communication appears encompassed under the Court of Justice test, the fact that the information is delivered by electronic means would be irrelevant. That it uses a ‘push’ distribution model also seems irrelevant, especially in light of the facts of the case. Spam, moreover, usually has broad public distribution. As the profit-making aspect is not preclusive, that it is commercial speech does not, of itself, set the boundary. 
A remaining possible relevant limitation arising from the Court of Justice’s words to unsolicited commercial information is whether the processing activities in question were ‘solely’ for the purpose of disclosing information to the public. Where the communication is not simply a vehicle for delivering trojans, adware or other malware, ascertaining its purpose(s) is not necessarily a simple analysis. The valuable “information” purpose of commercial speech was noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in according some freedom of speech protection to a prohibited advertisement when it stated: 
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. And if it is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision making in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that goal. ​[35]​  
Article 10 does not preclude a similar analysis; commercial speech has been protected under Article 10, ECHR.​[36]​ Although the boundaries of such protection are uncertain due to the considerable margin of appreciation accorded member states by the European Court of Human Rights,​[37]​ relevant here is that even the theoretical possibility of spam amounting to journalism under the journalistic purposes test of the Satakaunnan decision shows how overly broad it is.​[38]​ 
This raises the further question of how one determines when the “sole” object of the activities is distribution of information to the public even in a non-commercial speech context? While the plain meaning is “single” or “only one”,​[39]​ there can readily be multiple objectives in conveying information, opinions and ideas even within traditional concepts of journalism, such as to effect social change, support political candidates or positions and influence the opinions of others. In Italy, for example, there are still newspapers published by political parties and affiliated with interest groups.​[40]​ Similarly, the UK’s Press Complaint Commissions Editorial Code of Practice, a self-regulatory code administered by a largely media industry body, provides that the UK press are free to be partisan.​[41]​ 
The Swedish Supreme Court in Public Prosecutor v. Ramsbro​[42]​ in determining the applicability of Article 9 to a website, in contrast, noted that the limitation in Article 9 is ‘solely for journalistic purposes’ and aimed ‘primarily at clarifying that such personal data processing operations in the mass media and journalists for other than editorial purposes falls outside the exemption.’​[43]​  According to Ramsbro Court, the exemption could not, in other words, encompass the treatment of personal information for billing or surveying reader profiles.​[44]​ While this tailored analysis makes sense since it is an exemption regarding the processing of personal data, the ECJ test is not so neatly reasoned or clearly circumscribed in the context of personal data. It therefore remains vague as to its meaning and scope.
3.	Necessity for the Court’s Approach
Given its potential vagaries and overlaps, the need for the Court of Justice to have established such a sweeping and possibly unworkable test is questionable. Firstly, the Court of Justice did not need to reach this particular issue in the case before it. Article 9 of the Directive merely allows Member States to determine the scope of derogations for processing of personal data as necessary to balance the respective interests of the right to privacy under Article 8 and freedom of expression under Article 10, ECHR interests. This permissive language resulted in a range of Member State provisions that the Commission has noted to encompass a continuum of derogations ranging from the very broad under stated primacy of freedom of expression such as that of Sweden and Denmark to very limited derogations for the press such as that of Spain and Greece where processing of sensitive personal data for journalistic purposes requires the prior approval by the data protection authority.​[45]​ Article 9 of the Directive may accommodate a variety of approaches to address legitimate divergent views of the balance to be set between these two fundamental but not absolute Convention rights, here possibly arising from cultural differences, ​[46]​ an approach that Advocate General Kokott here posited​[47]​ and that the Court has recognised in other circumstances.​[48]​ The EU Commission has also noted that this accommodation is partly addressed by the Member State laws and rules governing the press, including codes of conduct and further by the extensive jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights under Articles 8 and 10.​[49]​ Thus, and as urged by the Advocate General, the Court of Justice could have taken a more conservative approach which allowed the Member State a broader discretion under its own implementation of the Article 9 derogations.​[50]​ Thus, as the Advocate General suggested, the Court could have merely designated the fundamental rights at issue, given some general guidance (which could have encompassed the traditional media versus evolving technologies and for-profit issues) in light of prior case law and allowed the national court to set the fair and proportionate balance in analysing whether a journalistic purpose existed in the instant case.​[51]​ 
Nor does there seem to be precedent requiring this outcome in either the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice or of the European Court of Human Rights, the ultimate interpreter of compliance with the Convention. Article 10 of the Convention guarantees freedom of expression​[52]​ which the European Court of Human Rights has held constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and a basic condition to societal progress and individual development and self-fulfilment.​[53]​ While Article 10’s right to freedom of expression applies to every person by its very terms, the Court has held that special safeguards are guaranteed to the press for its key roles in imparting ideas and information toward these two ends​[54]​ and in its role as a vital public watchdog.​[55]​ The safeguards concern not only freedoms from restriction on publication but also on investigation and gathering of information.​[56]​ The rights as developed by case law of the Court of Human Rights are not always consistent as noted due to the margin of appreciation it accords the Contracting States in balancing other interests or rights especially in matters of expression involving economic​[57]​ and cultural issues.​[58]​ However, as reiterated by the Court recently in Financial Times v United Kingdom,​[59]​ the national margin of appreciation is circumscribed by the interest of democratic society in ensuring and maintaining a free press.​[60]​ This is to weigh heavily in assessing whether any competing legitimate interest is necessary, i.e., “socially pressing” and proportionate to that aim.​[61]​ Here the legitimate interests involved the specified derogations in Article 10(2). ​[62]​ The balancing, however, may involve other fundamental rights under the Convention such as privacy under Article 8, a typical balancing scenario when press freedoms are considered.  As Financial Times is a case which distils much of the Court’s jurisprudence involving freedom of expression and the press, a brief examination of the balancing analysis it has applied in such cases is helpful. 
In Financial Times, the Court of Human Right addressed the interference with the confidentiality of sources of information provided to the press. The UK courts had granted an injunction to Interbrew which ordered the FT and other papers to deliver up to Interbrew originals of a leaked document prepared by its consultants about a possible merger with another company, journalist notes of any interviews with the source and any other information about the identity of the source. The source had allegedly altered the document to change the offer price being considered. The papers reported the merger and, in some instances, the purported offer indicated in the document. The market reacted to the reports and Interbrew’s share price dropped while the target company’s price rose. The newspapers refused to comply with the lower court’s order, subsequently affirmed on appeal to the House of Lords.
The Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 10 in the issuance of the injunction. In reaching this conclusion the ECHR considered whether the interference with the confidentiality of the source fell within the permitted derogations under Article 10 (2). It concluded that the UK courts’ acts were prescribed by law: (1) the common law principle under Norwich Pharmacal v. Customs & Excise Commissioners​[63]​ requiring an innocently involved party to disclose a wrongdoer’s identity or other information so as not to be liable himself and; (2) Section 10, UK Contempt of Court Act 1981​[64]​ which limits liability for contempt of court for failure to disclose the source of information in a publication for which one is responsible unless it is established to the court’s satisfaction that it is necessary in the interests of justice or for the prevention of disorder or crime.​[65]​ The Court of Human Rights also concluded that the UK courts had pursued a legitimate interest identified under Article 10(2):​[66]​ the protection of Interbrew’s interest in having information that might help it identify that party who had breached a duty of confidence against who it might recover and prevent future disclosure of confidential information.​[67]​ 
The Court of Human Rights, however, found this was not an overriding social interest outweighing that of protecting journalists’ sources because of the chilling effect it could have in deterring other sources from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest.​[68]​ In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined the prerequisites for the exercise of this freedom of expression, stating that ‘Article 10 protects a journalist's right – and duty – to impart information on matters of public interest provided that he is acting in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalism’.​[69]​ Mandating disclosure of sources without the requisite compelling public interest could undermine the press’ vital “public watchdog” role and its ability to provide accurate and reliable reporting.​[70]​ 
The tests rearticulated by the Court of Human Rights in the Financial Times decision show, however, that despite the considerable scope extended to the press under the broader freedom of expression public interest it upheld in that case, that: first, not every piece of information published rises to the level of public interest for protection under Article 10 and, second, that the Court of Human Rights has a threshold requirement for “journalism” protected thereunder.  The following considers each of these conclusions in turn.
As to the first, the Court has found that the press has a right and a duty to impart information and ideas on a broad range of topics in the public interest.​[71]​ Indeed, the Court has found Article 10 to encompass a wide range of information content including, e.g., politics, health,​[72]​ crime, finance, religion, national security,​[73]​  However, the enhanced protections accorded the press in light of this duty have not included such information as ‘tawdry allegations’ about a person’s private life (e.g., allegations of HIV positive status or the claim of out of wedlock paternity of children) falling outside the public interest threshold. Similarly inadequate is information merely pandering to the ‘prurient curiosity of a particular readership’ which the Court has found to include tabloid photos published about a famous but private person. In Von Hannover v Germany,​[74]​ a case involving a balance with Article 10 freedom of the press and Article 8 privacy interests, the Court found a violation of Article 8 in the failure of the German courts to redress the invasion of privacy by the press. This occurred in the taking and publishing of photographs of Princess Caroline of Monaco going about her daily life, including while in public places. In addressing the Article 10/Article 8 balance, the Court noted that there was a fundamental difference ‘between reporting facts -even controversial ones- capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society relating to politicians in the exercise of their functions, for example, and reporting details of the private life of an individual’ which the Court found Princess Caroline to be, despite her fame.​[75]​ Rather, here the Court found the value of the publications was that merely “intended to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership” which could not be ‘deemed to contribute to any debate of general interest to society despite the applicant being known to the public’.​[76]​ 

Moreover, von Hannover Court noted the need to enhance vigilance in protecting the right to a private life ‘to contend with new communication technologies which make it possible to store and reproduce personal data’ and disseminate it to a ‘broad section of the public’ as with the tabloid photos in question.​[77]​ Thus, the means of publication and the type of information that would fall within/without the public interest parameters required by the Court both factor in setting the balance in favour of Article 8 privacy rights over the Article 10 freedom of the press. Although the balance with Article 10 will clearly be affected by, inter alia, the nature of the competing interest, it is clear that there is no absolute default in favour of Article 10 with regard to Article 8 within the Court of Human Rights jurisprudence based on the mere dissemination of information to the public as suggested in Satakuanan.
 Beyond this qualitative public interest content test, it also appears that the Court of Human Rights has a threshold requirement for “journalist” or for “journalism” entitled to Article 10 protection: disclosure of accurate and reliable information published in good faith in conformity with journalistic ethics.​[78]​ Although the Court has found that journalistic freedom encompasses publications involving a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation,​[79]​ it has further required accuracy of information and compliance with journalistic ethics in publishing the information.​[80]​ The latter have included standards for the verification of information and the nature of the sources that can be relied on​[81]​ While generally these issues arise in the context of defamation actions typically within the Article 10(2) derogations, the conduct of the press in von Hannover in harassing the Princess, taking photos in secret and taking them without consent all contributed to the finding of the Court in upholding the Article 8 interests over those under Article 10.​[82]​ 

While the Court of Human Rights has specifically addressed “press” freedoms, responsibilities and journalistic ethics, it has not, however, really drawn a bright line test for journalist that would serve to exclude the new social media. The Court has rather stretched the boundaries of the concept to encompass entities serving the same or similar functions as traditional press which could readily be extended to qualifying new media. For example, in Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v Hungary,​[83]​  the Court for the first time found a positive right for the press to access information held by a state entity having a monopoly in that information beyond those limited circumstances it previously recognised typically involving impairment of other Convention rights. Because it effectively stood in the shoes of the press, the Court extended this new right of access under article 10 to the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, a non-governmental, civil society organisation. Specifically, justification arose in the media-like role that the HCLU plays as a public watchdog and in its creation of a forum for discussion on issues of public interest, both underlying its need for access to accurate information to disseminate to the public.​[84]​  
 
The above analysis indicates that the European Court of Justice has set a more expansive standard for journalistic purpose for the protection of Article 10 rights beyond that of the Court of Human Rights. The reasons for and consequences of this are yet unclear. Possibly since the Court of Justice’s interpretation of journalistic purpose under Article 9, Directive 95/46/EC tilts toward freedom of expression as it is so broad, the Court was attempting to forge greater convergence among the Member States’s freedom of the press standards, noted to be very diverse. Yet even Sweden’s implementation of Article 9, one of the Member States with the broadest derogation for journalism under its Data Protection Act, does not by its terms apply to all processing for journalistic purposes​[85]​ and applies a public interest qualification in defining the purpose of journalistic activity as being ‘to inform, exercise criticism and provoke debate about societal questions that are of larger significance for the general public.'​[86]​ Further, as the Court of Justice's Linqvist decision suggests not all information disclosed to the general public reaches this standard, even in Sweden. ​[87]​ 

4.	Impact of Satakuannan on EU Member State Law
There are two areas of concern regarding the potential impact on the law of EU Member States: that outside of the EU data protection regime and EU competence but with analogous protections for press freedoms and possibly language and that in the context of Member State implementation of the Data Protection Directive.  The following addresses each in turn.  
a.	Non-EU law regarding media regulation
It is very possible that Satakuannan’s test can sit readily along side of other laws in Member States that are not within EU competence. Media law governing defamation, libel, freedom of the press and expression are areas that have traditionally been within the purview of the states and subject to review by the European Court of Human Rights within their obligations under the Convention. Practically speaking, a different test or definition arising from a different source of law although involving similar issues/parties is not unheard of.  For example, this is true of the Swedish media law framework. The constitutional law of Sweden encompasses the Fundamental Freedom of the Press Act​[88]​ and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression.​[89]​ These protect the identities of sources that provide publishers, editors or news agencies with information and journalists can never be forced to reveal their sources. Written publications fall under the Freedom of the Press Act​[90]​ and other publications, the Law on Freedom of Expression. The latter can apply to websites offered to the public, apparently the protection Wikileaks sought to fall within, as earlier mentioned. However, for a website to be accorded this constitutional protection, an administrative decision evidenced in a certificate must be obtained from the Radio and Television Authority and based on meeting certain criteria.​[91]​ Among others, these include that the content not be able to be changed by users or come from various sources without an organizational context and also that the site have the appearance of a single, coherent service or product although the site’s purpose, the nature of the content and ownership of the site is irrelevant.​[92]​ Payment of a fee of almost £200 is required as well as a publisher with control over the content domiciled in Sweden. The triggers for the application of this scheme are diametrically opposed to the application of the privilege for journalism under the Data Protection Act as construed by the Swedish Supreme Court in Ramsbro which ultimately turned on the nature of the content and its purpose.  As the Court held, a website with content of such a nature to fall ‘within the framework of a journalistic purpose to inform, exercise criticism and debate about social issues of importance to the public’ could be subject to the privilege which was not conditioned on specific format.​[93]​ These two journalistic protections different in nature and application under two different legal frameworks, co-existed for 8 years before Satakuannan.  
Yet, it is not good policy to premise legal theory development on a mandatory application of a broad standard using a broad-brush balancing approach purported to be in conformity with the Convention and therefore, theoretically in conformity with the fundamental principles and values of Member State law where as here imposed via a narrow area of competence under the Convention. In this case it is in the context of a grant of a discretionary derogation power to the Member States to the extent they found it necessary to reconcile privacy rights under the EU data protection framework premised on Article 8, ECHR with those of Article 10, ECHR, and without particular regard for the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence and examination of the freedom of expression traditions of the Member States under other laws. This approach rather than fostering harmonisation appears likely to promote a legal balkanization for Member States and Convention rights with respect to EU law application and non-EU law until the scope of the relevant powers of the ECJ and the ECHR with respect to the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights are further detailed by an EU/ECHR accession agreement. This is also likely to be perpetuated until the ECJ clearly articulates its reliance on the EU Charter within the exclusive context of EU law application​[94]​ and which theoretically should not be divorced from Convention rights as construed by the ECHR and Member State constitutional principles since this is the foundation of general principles of EU law​[95]​ as the Charter is considered. 
b.	Member State Data Protection Law
Even within the purely EU data protection regime context, the unnecessary and potentially disruptive impact of the Satakaunnan decision can be seen by analysing the implementation of Article 9, Directive 95/46/EC in two other Member States: Italy and England, as follows.​[96]​ The Italian Data Protection Code​[97]​ incorporates a journalist exception at Articles 136-138, thereby implementing the permissive Article 9, Directive 95/46/EC.​[98]​ The Italian law exempts qualifying processing from the application of certain rules otherwise applicable for processing of personal data, (e.g., consent, transborder data limitations, required authorisations for processing sensitive data from the Italian data protection authority, the Garante).​[99]​ Qualifying processing within Italy’s exception includes that: 1) carried out in the exercise of professional journalism and solely for related purposes,​[100]​ 2) by free-lance journalists or those on the roll of trainee journalists​[101]​ and; 3) carried out on “a temporary basis exclusively for the purposes of publication or occasional circulation of articles, essays and other intellectual works also in terms of artistic expression.”​[102]​ 

This would seem more restrictive than “every person” under Satakaunnan. The Garante Commissioner indicates, however, that this and the co-regulatory Code of Practice for journalist activities mandated by Section 138​[103]​ apply to all journalists, photographers, and camera operators as well as any person regularly or occasionally publishing articles, essays or other intellectual works and that unlike other “conventional” codes this encompasses non-professional journalists.​[104]​ The medium where publishing occurs, moreover, is not articulated and thus likely includes non-professional bloggers writing articles or essays or ‘You Tube’ photographers. Whether it also includes Twitter users or mass texters or other disclosers to the public of information, opinion or ideas via other new media is not discussed or apparent, although the Commissioner’s use of the words “saggi e altre manifestazioni del pensiero”​[105]​ or “essays and other manifestations of thought” suggest that publication of ideas beyond a formal article or essay structure is contemplated. The precise boundaries of the Code of Practice’s applicability are broad but unclear and therefore as well, its status on this issue under Satakuannan. As compliance with the Code of Practice is not a voluntary form of self-regulation with only internal sanctions but necessary for legal compliance with the Data Protection Code to avoid liability,​[106]​ it suggests the need for further consideration in light of the Court of Justice opinion. 

The Italian Data Protection Code, additionally, imposes a ‘materiality’ test that incorporates a public interest standard for the journalistic disclosure of personal data. It provides that where data are communicated or disseminated for the above-listed journalistic purposes, the limitations on obligations to protect fundamental privacy and data protection rights of data subjects are not prejudiced where it was material information with regard to facts of public interest.​[107]​ As explained by the Commissioner, where personal data is processed, its materiality to the story in light of facts in the public interest must be considered.​[108]​ Hence, where names, addresses or other personal information are immaterial to provide the news, this information must not be included or the processing will not fall within the journalistic exception. The Code of Practice applies further restrictions of “substantial” and “indispensable” information in light of specified factors.​[109]​ These additional criteria for continued application of the data protection journalistic exemption in Italy, therefore, are certainly limitations more restrictive than that of the Court of Justice in Satakuannan. 

The UK Data Protection Act 1998​[110]​ includes journalism as one of three ‘special purposes’ for which personal data may be processed the other two being literary and artistic purposes.​[111]​ It is relevant for Section 32, DPA 1998, which exempts personal data processed only for the special purpose from a specified list of potential data protection obligations otherwise governing the processing of personal data, including sensitive data,​[112]​ where:
(a) the processing is undertaken with a  view to the publication by any person of any journalistic, literary or artistic material,
(b) the data controller reasonably believes that, having regard in particular to the special importance of the public interest in freedom of expression, publication would be in the public interest, and
(c) the data controller reasonably believes that, in all the circumstances, compliance with that provision is incompatible with the special purposes.​[113]​
 
Under Section 32 (3), DPA 1998, the determination of whether the controller’s belief that a publication is in the public interest is or was reasonable can consider his compliance with a relevant code of practice applicable to that publication and designated by the Secretary of State for this purpose.​[114]​ The Press Complaint Commission Code and the Broadcasting Code are designated.​[115]​ 
Preliminary analysis shows that two aspects of the UK law are clearly compliant with Satakuannan. Under Section 32 (a), DPA 1998 ‘publication by any person’ can be interpreted to meet the Court of Justice’s requirement that the protections of Article 9, Directive 95/46/EC apply to ‘any person engaged in journalism.’​[116]​ ‘Publish’ in connection with ‘special purposes’ processing under the DPA 1998 is defined merely as ‘make available to the public or any section of the public’​[117]​ and thus equates with disclosure to the public in Satakuannan, although a bit more precise with the further refinement of any subsection of the public.    
Other aspects pose difficulty. The UK imposes a public interest standard for publication in the context of a derogation under Article 9, Directive 95/46/EC. This similarly contrast with Satakuannan in that not any information, opinion or idea disclosed to the public involving the processing of personal data will meet this standard. Although what comprises the public interest is not defined by the DPA 1998, the reasonable belief that a publication was in the public interest can be judged by reference to the designated and applicable codes of conduct as noted above. If this qualitative limitation on journalistic purpose is compliant with the Court of Justice test, how non-traditional media would meet it to show reasonableness with regard to an ‘applicable’ code is not immediately apparent.  

The Broadcasting Code applies to radio and TV program service providers.​[118]​ The Code’s standards are promulgated and enforced by OFCOM, the converged UK communications regulator. OFCOM indicates that indirect application of the Code may arise with other content/media via a possible obligation to disable links where the broadcasters provide access links to content other than their own but over which they have no editorial control.​[119]​ The specific media is not clear.  

The Press Complaints Commission code (PCC), the Editors’ Code of Practice, binds all regional and national newspapers and magazines and their websites.​[120]​ This voluntary code developed by the newspaper and periodical industry is ratified and enforced by the Commission which identifies itself as an independent body responsible for addressing complaints from the public about breaches of the Editors’ Code of Practice.​[121]​ Editors and publishers are responsible for overseeing its observance in both printed and online versions of publications.​[122]​ The Code has standards that govern the gathering, verification and dissemination of information, all of which could readily apply to non-traditional ‘publications’. However, its stated limitation to traditional print media and now their online activities​[123]​ which although use social media forms as well do not comprise every person engaged in journalism as would be needed to meet Satakaunnan.  

Examination of the substantive compliance of the PCC Code with the Court of Justice decision, suggests initially that it is not. The PCC also has an internal public interest test which recognizes public interest exceptions to eight specified PCC standards, most involving likely privacy interests under Article 8, ECHR, if not all comprising personal data.​[124]​ Public interest under the PCC Code includes, inter alia: 1) detecting or exposing crime or serious impropriety; 2) protecting public health and safety; 3) preventing an action or statement of an individual or organisation from misleading the public.​[125]​ While these qualitatively delimit the nature of information considered within ethical dissemination and therefore more restrictive than Satakuannan, a further exception provides that freedom of expression of itself can be a public interest.​[126]​ On its face this could theoretically level mere publication of any information to that falling within the public interest and, thus, comprising a substantive equivalent to Satakuannan. However this is not likely intended as, ipso facto, its own absolute justification. Firstly, the Code appears to evolve to incorporate ECHR jurisprudence as it evolves as well,​[127]​ or at least as far the UK courts have confronted it. As discussed, while the ECHR has found an overarching general freedom of expression justification to underly the ECHR’s press source protection in Financial Times, it was there in the context of a counterbalancing against a competing narrower, less compelling, private interest and not asserted as an absolute value irrespective of any competing interest. Moreover, no UK Court has adopted such a broad concept of ‘journalism’ or freedom of expression as that of Satakuannan. 

This is so even where the case involved identical language, if not analogous issues, under a different legal framework not generally within EU competence. In Sugar v. BBC,​[128]​ the UK Court of Appeals applied a functional test for journalist and ‘journalistic purposes’ in reviewing a High Court decision that construed these terms in the context of the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA).​[129]​ That decision arose from a 2005 FOIA request by Mr. Sugar for a report from the British Broadcasting Commission (BBC) concerning its reporting on the Middle East. The FOIA grants a general right of access to information held by public authorities, of which the BBC is one but only with regard to information held “for purposes other than those of journalism, art or literature.”​[130]​ In response to the request, the BBC, inter alia, asserted that the report comprised information held for journalistic purposes and that therefore the FOIA did not apply to it. Sugar appealed to the Information Commissioner and then to the Information Tribunal​[131]​ which, in overturning the Commissioner’s decision, posited a functional test for journalistic activities to arrive at a division between information about BBC operations and other activities likely to fall within the FOIA and those in the context of journalistic purposes outside its scope. Here, the Information Tribunal opined that journalistic activity could be distinguished by activity falling within three component functions: the news gathering and writing process, the editorial process and an overarching quality assurance process for accuracy and professionalism.  It stated:

[A] more useful distinction may be between functional journalism and the direction of policy, strategy and resources that provide the framework within which the operations of a [public service broadcaster] take place.
 In relation to functional journalism we find that it covers collecting or gathering, writing, editing and presenting material for publication, and reviewing that material. In order to further understand functional journalism the Tribunal considers the following three elements constitute functional journalism 
The first is the collecting or gathering, writing and verifying of materials for publication. 
The second is editorial. This involves the exercise of judgement on issues such as: 
	the selection, prioritisation and timing of matters for broadcast or publication, 
	the analysis of and review of individual programmes, 
	the provision of context and background to such programmes. 
The third element is the maintenance and enhancement of the standards and quality of journalism (particularly with respect to accuracy, balance and completeness). This may involve the training and development of individual journalists, the mentoring of less experienced journalists by more experienced colleague, professional supervision and guidance, and reviews of the standards and quality of particular areas of programme making.​[132]​

On the BBC’s further appeal on the substantive issues,​[133]​ a majority of the Court of Appeal endorsed the Tribunal’s three-part analysis of journalism.​[134]​ As the Master of the Rolls stated in his opinion: “It seems to me that the word should be given its natural meaning, and, in that connection, the Tribunal's analysis … above is not one which I could improve on, at least in the present context.”​[135]​ 
The “present context” is clearly a narrow one, the FOIA. English common law and statute involving privileges likely to involve journalists are not delimited by that term. For example, a qualified defense to defamation extends to comments made without malice reasonably believed to be true concerning matters which the person publishing the statements was under a duty to make or had a legitimate interest in so doing and the person(s) to whom the statements were made had either a duty or a legitimate interest in receiving.​[136]​  Similarly, the statutory privilege from disclosing a source of information contained in a publication applies to “any person”.​[137]​ 
Thus, the Sugar decision appears to have limited precedential potential beyond statutes with identical language, which of course is the case with the DPA 1998.  In the context of the Data Protection Act, assuming arguendo some persuasive effect of the Sugar functional test for journalistic purposes seemingly at odds with Satakuannan’s, the applicable scope has further relevance: the Section 55 criminal offence provisions. These make it an offence to knowingly or recklessly obtain or disclose personal data or procure it for another without the consent of the data controller.​[138]​ A recent new defense to that section applies when a person acts for journalistic purposes with a view to the publication of journalistic material and in the reasonable belief that the actions were justified as being in the public interest.​[139]​ This revision lowers the standard under this Section 55 public interest defense to intentional or reckless processing of personal data without consent from a showing that the conduct was actually in the public interest​[140]​ to a reasonable belief of this judged at the time of the otherwise criminal offence thereby bringing it into alignment with the wording of Section 32. This exemption therefore permits what is otherwise an intentional crime as long as there is a reasonable belief of a public interest, possibly in the information itself, although this is not stated. Unlike Section 32, however, here there is no reference to external standards of reasonableness or public interest. Arguably the reasonableness standard would be judged by reference to the Sec. 32 self–regulatory standards since these are essentially complementary provisions. Thus, the fit of Sec. 55 with the Satakuannan decision would track those previously discussed limitations. This may result in this criminal provision fairly meaningless since now nearly anyone can have a claim of journalistic purpose under the broad ex ante standard of Satakuannan and since what amounts to a reasonable belief of the public interest could be muddied if governed solely by tests that appear to apply to established media alone pursuant to the referenced codes under s. 32.  If this were considered a provision implemented without reference to Article 9 of the Directive, which is questionable, and thus avoiding the impact of Satakuannan, would mean the application of two different journalistic purposes standards within the same legal framework.  
Even this brief examination of the national legal frameworks implementing the journalistic purposes privilege of the Data Protection Directive in Italy and the UK indicates that neither conforms to the test set by the Court of Justice in Satakaunnan. Each has included a public interest test for a evaluating the application of a journalistic purpose exemption​[141]​ to justify the intrusion on privacy by the processing of personal data without the need to comply with obligations of the Directive. Irrespective of whether this public interest test has been introduced via case law, code of practice or secondary legislation as with these Member States, it has been fully implemented, suggesting that a legal reckoning on the issue EU-wide could happen. Ironically, however, little concern has been raised about the ECJ’s decision in Satakuannan with the possibly unless and until the Court of Justice confronts the issue again head on, the import of Satakaunnan is unknown and possibly marginalized, perhaps due to its own limiting unique facts although this was clearly not the Court’s intent.

An indicator of this possibility and legal ‘non-event’ status is the lip-service response of the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court's on remand. Here the Court stated that while whether the processing fell within journalistic purposes required assessment of whether the purpose of the activity was information, opinions and ideas to the public, it also held, however, that “the assessment must take into account the extent to which activities can be considered to promote socially interesting debate rather than … debate on the social isolation of individuals to satisfy curiosity.” The Finnish Court looked not only to the European Court of Justice opinion but also to the jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights, particularly Caroline von Hannover v Germany.​[142]​ This, according to the Supreme Administrative Court requires greater attention to the protection of private life in light of the new communication technologies abilities to maintain and reproduce personal information in the balance of privacy versus freedom of expression, noting that the decisive factor for the Court of Human Rights in von Hannover was the general interest nature of the discussion with greater restriction on freedom of expression where intended only “to satisfy a readership of curiosity.”​[143]​ Turning to the SMS service in question which allowed the public to request tax and income data on any individual, the Finnish Court found that the processing to provide it was not discussion of social interest necessary in a democratic society and therefore not permissible processing for journalistic purposes under the Data Protection Act in addition to failing to meet the “to the public test” as previously discussed.​[144]​ The Supreme Administrative Court in applying a public interest test, effectively, used a second individual assessment of necessity under Article 8, ECHR standards​[145]​ directly to determine the applicability of the derogation in this specific instance thereby obviating the need for reliance on any balance under Article 9 of the Directive. 

This was arguably possible here as since EU Member States are also all Contracting States to the ECHR, they are directly responsible for complying with it as an individual nation. Since the EU Court of Justice test of journalism for purposes of identifying when processing is privileged with a lesser burden under the Data Protection Directive applies to processing of personal data that is also probably protected directly under Article 8, ​[146]​ to the extent this does not conform with the standards set by the European Court of Human Rights, EU Member States may arguably need to apply a second test in order to achieve a fair and proportionate balance of their Article 8, ECHR obligations with Article 10 rights.​[147]​ A different balance for the same issue purportedly under Article 8 as applied by the EU within Directive 95/46/EC and that directly under Article 8 presents a difficult legal parsing, however. It also hints at the complexity that is the balancing between freedom of expression involving the press and journalism under Article 10, only a subset of freedom of expression rights that are not absolute but to be balanced with other legitimate interests which can either be within its permitted derogations such as protecting confidential information or the reputation of others or with equally fundamental rights such as privacy under Article 8. The complexity of the analysis in this area and its fit within the legal regimes of EU Member States as Council of Europe and Convention states is attributable in part to the fact that Court of Human Rights has not really drawn a bright line tests for journalism or the press and in part by the case-by-case analysis of the Court due to the varying interests at stake and the application of a limited margin of appreciation for them. Yet the use of a public interest test in the application of journalistic codes and decisions applying a privilege such as that under Article 9 of the Data Protection is not unwarranted. As discussed, the European Court of Human Rights has often accorded press meeting ethical obligations and professional responsibilities with respect to information and ideas in the public interest considerable protection under Article 10 even when balanced against competing fundamental interests. Moreover, the further distinct individual analysis of any Convention rights and using its criteria of “necessary” is likely essential. As the Court of Justice has itself noted, while there is an internal balance within the Directive and a margin of appreciation as to how each Member State implements it, “it is, rather, at the stage of the application at national level of the legislation implementing Directive 95/46 in individual cases that a balance must be found between the rights and interests involved.”​[148]​   

Despite this, one wonders why since the Directive’s derogation grants a significant ex ante permission to those engaged in journalism to avoid distinct obligations with respect to personal data in order to protect freedom of the press the Court could not have provided greater up-front guidance as to what is eligible for such special treatment to ensure that individual instances of ex post court decisions could be avoided. There are ways that this could have been achieved in a technologically and institutionally neutral manner. First, the ECJ could have posited fairly simple guidance about a general ex ante public interest weighting. An example of this is found in the Swedish Supreme Court’s analysis in Ramsbro v Prosecutor which although making clear that no medium or person was a priori excluded from the derogation under Article 9 of the Directive, found the balance in favour of the ‘journalistic purposes only’ derogation arose in the context of ‘issues relevant to the public’ and ‘free debate on societal issues’.​[149]​ Using another approach, akin to Sugar, the ECJ could have incorporated some objective, presumptively quality enhancing criteria to help distinguish publications worth of special or privileged treatment under the law, where necessary, from every other merely public conversation or dissemination using social and other media. This approach that has been posited as workable beyond traditional media boundaries​[150]​ considers that there is an objective process to legitimate journalism that seeks to gather, evaluate and disseminate truthful information to the public.​[151]​ Using such criteria for triggering legal protection obviates case-by-case distinctions based on organizational status, e.g., such as a “newspaper” or affiliation with traditional media as well as particular titles or labels such as “blogger” or “tweeter” which may only be stops on the road of converging and evolving media platforms. Addressing the above concern, this approach allows for the continued dissemination of information to the public without prior constraint yet avoids vague and theoretical distinctions as to whether something falls on this or that side of news or entertainment or mere “tittle tattle”​[152]​ while providing a meaningful evaluative tool to identify journalism the content of which is presumptively in the public interest. This would eliminate the key weakness resulting from the Court of Justice decision, that if all are journalists, then no one is a journalist entitled ex ante to special treatment. 

5.	Conclusion
There is a need for a legal standard that permits a clear legal test for journalist that is flexible enough to accommodate non-traditional media but with sufficient qualitative rigor to delimit privilege to actual journalism. Over or under-inclusive criteria mean that journalists risk being a legal club where only entrenched media can continue to belong or where, because all are possibly included, there cannot really be instances of special protection for the press which many consider necessary to ensure freedom of expression for the public. The greatest risk here, however, no matter what legal test is used, would be the failure to address adequately the merits of alternative publications and thereby undermine their potential legitimacy and possibly expose them to legal risk of liability different from that of traditional media institutions.   
 Yet, as the discussion has shown an approach based on public interest, including via functional criteria has been applied consistently by the European Court of Human Rights​[153]​ as well as recently endorsed by the UK Court of Appeals. These approaches obviate the noted risks as threshold eligibility for the exercise of privilege or priority over another interest focuses on the public interest nature of the content or the professional processes of journalism rather than on labels or status such as ‘newspaper’ or ‘broadcaster’. These tests would protect disseminations of information or ideas in a media/technology neutral way. Such approaches also have the benefit of encouraging new forms of journalism that reach different members of the public, for example, younger people who might ‘follow’ on Twitter but might rarely read a newspaper even online or watch broadcast news. It also permits recognition as journalism of new discussion forms and forums (think ‘The Daily Show’ or ‘The Huffington Post’) that can serve as a counterpoint to traditional media with their possible vested interests and image. The functional process criteria moreover could be applied with relative ease since it could be largely objective, verifying whether journalistic activity has taken place that can include a sequence of activity from news gathering and investigating to the editorial planning as suggested in Sugar as well as the overall quality assurance with respect to the publication which can be construed as adherence, even voluntary, to a code of practice. This alone could separate a journalistic publication from all other public diffusions in the new media. A quality standard overlay of some kind, such as content in the public interest or compliance with a code of journalistic ethics for the person which presumes the former, even self-stated and regulating, could be encompassed within either the eligibility threshold itself or in the balancing exercise with the competing interest determination of whether an interference with the freedom of expression/the press is proportionate or necessary according to the jurisprudence of a jurisdiction as seen with the European Court of Human Rights.
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